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ABSTRACT: The re- of ‘restrain’ — not the more common iterat-
ive ‘re-’ but a mere, if semantically obscure intensifier — marks a
temporal paradox: the restraint that prevents a force from reach-
ing its telos is not only a delay, but the intervention of a separate,
autonomous, and anti-teleological regime of time.The article reads
the biblical figure of the katéchon, ‘the withholder’, as an expression
of this paradox and as symptomatic of a political-theological am-
bivalence essential to the foundation of Western political thought.
If the ‘secular order’ or ‘worldly government’ has the function of
withholding both the ultimate salvation and the final outbreak of
chaos, then it sustains itself only by postponing any determination
of its value or effect.
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Restrain
CHRISTIANE FREY
The ‘re-’word this article examines is the verb ‘to restrain’
— and the nouns derived from it: ‘the restrainer’ and ‘the
restraint’. The word stems from the Latin restringere and
means, first and foremost, ‘to hold back’, ‘to withhold’; it
can also mean to ‘bind back’, to ‘put in chains’ or figur-
atively to ‘put in limits’ or simply ‘to limit’. Interestingly
enough, the Latin restringere can also mean to ‘reveal’ or
‘to lay bare’— for example, a sword (ferrum) or one’s own
hand (manum).1
What is the particular function of the ‘re-’ in thisword?
Since both stringere and restringere denote the action of
‘binding’, one can indeed pose the question what exactly
1 See the entries on ‘restringere’ in Gerhard Köbler, Lateini-
sches Abkunfts- und Wirkungswörterbuch, 2nd edn (2009)
<http://www.koeblergerhard.de/Latein/LateinischesWB.pdf>
[accessed 20 December 2018], p. 1103; Hermann Menge,
Langenscheidts Großwörterbuch Latein, 2 vols (Berlin: Langenscheidt,
2001), ii: Lateinisch-deutsch, unter Berücksichtigung der Etymologie,
p. 809. — I cannot withhold my gratitude for sustained critique
and comments from my co-fellows at the ICI Berlin, as well as from
Christoph Holzhey and Arnd Wedemeyer.
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the prefix ‘re-’ here contributes. For very obviously, it does
not connote a repetition or a restitution — this is not
an iterative ‘re-’. An act of restringere does not stringere
something again, nor does it take it back to its original
status. Rather, the ‘re-’ must be functioning as an inten-
sifier, adding emphasis to the meaning already expressed
in the base, stringere. Like many Latin prefixes, such as
‘ad-’, ‘ex-’, or ‘cum-’, ‘re-’ can have the function of an as-
pect marker, signifying ‘thoroughness’. ‘Resplendent’, for
example, means not to shine (splendere) again or to shine
back, but to shine brightly. Similarly, ‘to restrain’ would
thus mean to bind, but to do so thoroughly or fully: per-
haps with great intensity, force, or effect.
This way of parsing the word, however, does not yet
tell the whole story. The intensifying ‘re-’, here, does not
merely strengthen the root meaning while leaving it un-
changed; rather, it carries additional connotations, con-
notations that add to or even alter themeaning of the base.
For the intensificationof the stringere in restringeremust say
something about the object of this act of binding. If what
is being bound is something that must be restrained, re-
strictum, rather than simply strictum or bound, then there
must be something about it that calls for the intensifica-
tion of the binding signified by the ‘re-’. If stringere points
to the simple act of ‘tying’ or ‘binding’, restringere would
refer, in addition, to the restraint of something that would
otherwise, were it not restrained, be in flow, in movement,
that is: ongoing. ‘To restrain’ implies that something that
would otherwise continue to perform or execute its force,
or move in whatever direction it presses toward, has been
arrested. Put differently, the ‘re-’ of restringere only makes
sense in reference to a force that is being countered, a force
that continues to exert itself even if, or even when, it is
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being prevented from achieving its aim. If there were no
force, action, or movement at the outset, there could be
no restraint. And one could go still further: the movement
or action that is being arrested must be such that it could,
potentially, succeed in overcoming the restraining force.
If the force being restrained were weak, or of inconsistent
direction, the act of restraining would be superfluous. In
every restraint, then, there are two forces at work: one that
aims, obviously, at continuing its course, or, to say the least,
aims at not being arrested; and one that arrests, one that
suspends — even if intermittently or provisionally — an
action or motion. The very ‘re-’ in ‘restrain’ implies by ne-
cessity two different dynamics, or two opposed forces.
The ‘re-’ of the re-strainer thus points to a temporal
paradox. The very expression ‘to re-strain’ necessarily im-
plies two times: one, a time that flows forward, and another
that arrests, slows or interrupts this forward-flowing time.
It thus entails a time and a countertime, a time of flow and
a time of halting. The result of the action of restringere is a
pause, a halting of motion that would otherwise have been
relentless. Evidently, the restrainer can therefore only be
understood as an anti-teleological figure. The telos that is
negatively implied in the concept of restringere— the telos
of the movement that has been arrested— is not achieved
or at least not yet achieved; it is, on the contrary, preven-
ted, for an indefinite period of time. Now, how are we to
understand the timeof the restraint? Is it ameredelay in the
movement that has been arrested—and thus of essentially
the same nature as the time that would have been marked
out by the movement it prevents? Any chronological de-
scription of the process of restraint would force us to see it
this way: a (potential) movement has been restrained; just
as this movement would have covered a certain distance in
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a certain span of time, so the delay occupies a span of time,
of the very same time in which the movement’s progress
toward its telos could have beenmeasured. In fact, however,
if the time of the restraint is of indefinite duration, and this
is the common sense of ‘restrain’, then the time of the re-
straintwould seem to be of an entirely different nature than
the time of what is being restrained. A restraint is more
than a simple delay, a postponement in one and the same
time as that occupied by what it postpones. Rather, a re-
straint interrupts not just a movement but the very time of
that movement, in order to institute another kind of time:
the indefinite, non-teleological, open-ended time of the re-
straint. The restraint does not just arrest a movement, but
suspends the very time of that movement and imposes its
own, essentially different regime of time. Since its duration
is indeterminate (the act of restraining could stop after a
few seconds or go on for ages), the act of restraining, in
other words, gains a certain autarchy.
Of course, in the history of (theo-political) culture,
there is a particular concept or figure that points precisely
to this ‘double-bound’ movement: the notorious katéchon.
Themain reference for themany and varied interpretations
of this concept is Paul’s (or Pseudo-Paul’s) Second Epistle
to the Thessalonians (2. 6-7). Given its importance and
impact on (past and present) theo-political concepts, I will
quote it here in its entirety:
1Concerning the coming [tēs parousias] of our Lord
Jesus Christ and our being gathered to him, we ask
you, brothers and sisters, 2not to become easily un-
settled or alarmed by the teaching allegedly from
us — whether by a prophecy or by word of mouth
or by letter — asserting that the day of the Lord
has already come. 3Don’t let anyone deceive you in
any way, for that day will not come until the rebel-
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lion [apostasia] occurs and the man of lawlessness
is revealed [kai apokaluphthēi ho anthrōpos tēs ano-
mias], the man doomed to destruction. 4He will
oppose and will exalt himself over everything that
is called God or is worshiped, so that he sets him-
self up in God’s temple, proclaiming himself to be
God. 5Don’t you remember that when I was with
you I used to tell you these things? 6And now you
know what is holding him back [to katechon], so
that he may be revealed [apokaluphthēnai] at the
proper time. 7For the secret power of lawlessness
[to mustērion tēs anomias] is already at work [en-
ergeitai]; but the one who now holds it back [ho
katechōn] will continue to do so till he is taken out
of the way. 8And then the lawless one will be re-
vealed [apokaluphthēsetai ho anomos], whom the
Lord Jesus will overthrow with the breath of his
mouth and destroy by the splendor of his coming
[tē epiphaneia tēs parousias autou].2
In this passage, the present participle of the verb katechō
is used, first in the neuter (to katechon), then in the mas-
culine (hō katechōn). In both cases, its meaning is ‘the
restrainer’: first, it is a something, some kind of power that
defers, restrains, postpones; and then it is ‘the one’, ‘he’
who restrains. Now, what exactly does this ‘restrainer’ hold
back? According to the quoted passage, it is evidently the
‘lawlessness’, ‘the evil’ — but that is not all. At the same
time that the katéchon restrains evil, it/he also keeps it from
coming to light (anothermeaningof theLatin restringere).3
The katéchon impedes and postpones both the unleashing
and the revelation of evil, of iniquity. For the revelation of
evil occurs only with the second coming of the messiah,
2 Quoted according to Holy Bible: New International Version (Colorado
Springs: Biblica, 1984). The Greek is transcribed according to Novum
Testamentum Graece, ed. by Eberhard Nestle, Barbara Aland, and Kurt
Aland (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2012).
3 See above, fn 1.
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the so-called parousia. Only when evil is revealed or on the
condition that it fully manifests itself, is it in fact destroyed
(one of the underlying messages of this passage).4 And it
is in this sense that the katéchon must be understood as a
Janus-faced figure (just as it is both neuter and masculine
in the passage). It holds back the outburst of evil, of chaotic
lawlessness, but at the same time it alsoholds back the reve-
lation and hence the ultimate defeat of evil.The katéchon is
thus the biblical figure that stands for ‘order’ (nomos)while
the ‘secret power of lawlessness’ (to mustērion tēs anomias)
is at work. (It should be added, of course, that nomos is ne-
cessary only because there is anomias—and the anomias is
here not to be confused with grace or any other state that
would transcend the nomos.)5 It controls the lawlessness
and postpones its unchecked eruption— but it can’t over-
come it. The final defeat of ‘lawlessness’ is reserved for the
messianic power.
In this very ambiguity lies, I would suggest, the
main significance of the katéchon as a kind of cultural
4 In Revelations 20. 2–3, 7–10, another passage points to the same logic:
here we read that the ‘ancient serpent’, which will have been ‘bound’
for a ‘thousand years’, ultimately, at the end of times, ‘must be let out
for a little while’ (the implication being, again, that this will lead to its
ultimate destruction).
5 Which is the reading Giorgio Agamben proposes inThe TimeThat Re-
mains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. by Patricia
Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). The katéchon is
a recurrent and clearly central figure in Agamben’s writings; see for
example: The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of
Economy and Government. Homo Sacer II, 4, trans. by Lorenzo Chiesa
(Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 2007); Stasis: CivilWar as a Polit-
ical Paradigm. Homo Sacer II, 2, trans. by Nicholas Heron (Stanford:
StanfordUniversity Press, 2015);TheMystery of Evil: Benedict XVI and
the End of Days, trans. by AdamKotsko (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2017); ‘Leviathan’s Riddle’, in Leviathans Rätsel, trans. by Paul
Silas Peterson (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013); The Church and the
Kingdom, trans. by Leland de la Durantaye (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 2012).
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Ur-concept of the double-movement or double-dynamic
of restringere.6 And a careful reading of the quoted passage
makes clear why, from Hippolytus and Tertullian to
Augustin and even to Luther, the katéchon at times stands
for political order as such, and at other times for the
Roman Empire (as the last Empire before the coming
of Christ),7 and at yet other times for both at once: the
political order is what controls the power of lawlessness
(while chaos and evil brew underneath). Worldly political
power thus cannot be condemned — it fulfils a necessary
function. At the same time, the political order is not to be
confused with the messianic, since the katéchon, as good
6 With this I do not mean to imply that the katéchon is the only ‘cultural
Ur-concept’ of the double-dynamic of restringere. But it seems to be a
particularly prominent and theo-politically charged concept implying
two opposing and, also in their temporality, opposed powers.
7 After the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the katéchon was iden-
tified, for example, with the Empire of Charles the Great and the Holy
Roman Empire of the German Nation. The Catholic Church, too, was
long believed to fulfil the katechontical function. See among many
other contributions to the history of the figure of the katéchon and
both its temporal and political implications: Carl Schmitt,The Nomos
of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum, trans.
by G. L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press, 2006), pp. 58–70; Wilhelm
Stählin, ‘Die Gestalt des Antichristen und das “katechon”’, in Festgabe
Joseph Lortz, ed. by Erwin Iserloh and Peter Manns, 2 vols (Baden-
Baden: Grimm, 1958), ii: Glaube und Geschichte, pp. 1–12; G. Meyer,
C. Schetter, and J. Prinz, ‘Spatial Contestation?TheTheological Foun-
dations of Carl Schmitt’s Spatial Thought’, Geoforum, 43 (2012), pp.
687–96; Sergei Prozorov, ‘The Katechon in the Age of Biopolitical
Nihilism’, Continental Philosophy Review, 45.4 (2012), pp. 483–505;
Felix Grossheutschi, Carl Schmitt und die Lehre vom Katechon (Ber-
lin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996); William Rasch, ‘Messias oder Kat-
echon? Carl Schmitts Stellung zur politischen Theologie’, in Politische
Theologie, ed. by Jürgen Brokoff and Jürgen Fohrmann (Paderborn:
Schöningh, 2003), pp. 39–54; Paul Metzger, Katechon: II Thess2, 1–
12 im Horizont apokalyptischen Denkens (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2005);
Roberto Esposito, Two:The Machine of Political Theology and the Place
of Thought, trans. by Zakiya Hanafi (New York: Fordham University
Press, 2015); Massimo Cacciari, The Withholding Power: An Essay on
Political Theology, trans. by Edi Pucci (London: Bloomsbury, 2018).
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and useful as it/he is in its/his restraining and controlling
potency, simultaneously withholds the second coming
of Christ, that is, the messianic event. By doing so and
by sustaining the state of affairs in which lawlessness
may remain concealed, the katéchon — that is, for the
sake of simplicity, the political order — does not exactly
collude with evil, but entertains an alliance with it.
It is this particular relationship with evil that renders
worldly power, as indispensable as it is, an always already
corrupted safeguard against disorder. No salvation and no
overcoming of the underlying anomic and chaotic powers
can occur within politics. At the same time, there is no
doing without politics.
With regards to a particular figure of the restrainer, the
power that withholds, the biblical katéchon, Roberto Es-
posito has noted, in his Immunitas, that there is an ‘aporetic
node of life and death, of momentum and restraint, of
opening and binding’ inherent to the katechontic.8 The
restraining katéchon is the principle that, in a way, with-
holds the comingof the end, therebypostponingdeath, the
ultimate limit or finis, or finitude tout court. Even if under-
stood independently of the biblical context, one could thus
understand the power that restrains at once as a negative
force — namely, as a force that withholds movement and
action (or drama in the sense of flowing and forward mov-
ing action) — and at the same time as a positive force, a
force that withholds the end, expiration, death.
My contention is that the ‘re-’ in ‘restrain’ is what
adds to the ‘strain’, the stringere, this aporetic dimension,
this double-bind of moving forward and halting, and this
double-logic of being at once something onewishes would
8 RobertoEsposito, Immunitas:TheProtection andNegation of Life, trans.
by Zakiya Hanafi (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), p. 57.
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prevail and something one wishes would loosen or release
to allow the motion to proceed. Restraint always has a
double focus — and an ambivalent one at that. It is also
my contention that the logic — the paradoxical logic —
of the restrainer is deeply ingrained in all processes of life,
of drama, of action, of being, and of politics: it is not only
the paradox that there is no action without it being at once
withheld and sustained, but also the ambivalence that it
will always remain unclear whether the end being striven
for is good or bad. The ‘re-’ of restringere thus points to
the inherent paradox of representing time as motion, to
the inherent ‘aporetic node’ of the restrainer itself. Read
before the backdrop of a long tradition of understanding
this aporetic logic of the withholding power in terms of the
katéchon, the prefix at the same time conveys towhat extent
diametrically opposed concepts of the political continue to
populate the Western imagination. If the ‘secular order’ or
‘worldly government’ has the function of withholding both
the ultimate salvation and the final outbreak of chaos, it
is unclear whether one should hasten its demise or work
for its enduring power. In this line of thought, a sustained
— and still outstanding— reflection on the katéchon in all
its cultural and imaginative ramifications might help to re-
strain, this time in the sense of ‘to expose’, important but, to
this day, insufficiently understood dimensions of the polit-
ical imagination of the West.
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demeyer, Cultural Inquiry, 15 (Berlin: ICI Berlin,
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